<< Dallas TX, DEC 6 2023 >> PLA : The 1993 Strategic Guidline - The Creation and Adoption NOTE: A large portion of the information in this article comes from a very good book. Active Defense: China’s Military Strategy since 1949. M. Taylor Fravel ,Princeton University Press, 2019. Especially chapters 1,6,7. We here at TDM recommend this book for its very in depth and thorough analyses of PLA Doctrine and its evolution. How is change effected in PLA Doctrine The US Military has a very formal and periodic reevaluation of potential threats and the required force postures to address these threats. This is called the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and is quite formal and exhaustive. Every four years, threats are evaluated and prioritized, a new operational doctrine is generated (if required), and the necessary force structure and training changes are implemented . One of the most important US doctrinal shifts occurred in 1986 with FM-100-5. This has come to be known generally as “Airland 2000”. This was a MAJOR conceptual and doctrinal shift for the US Army (Focused on the European theater) . The details of Airland 2000 are beyond the scope of this article, but its indirect impact on Chinese thought is profound. Airland 2000 doctrine was used very effectively in the 2 gulf wars . These wars in turn had a very direct impact on recent Chinese military thought. China, surprisingly , does not have an equivalent of the QDR. Its method of doctrinal change and adaptation is more ad-hoc and event driven. There is no periodic review. So what triggers a major change in PLA doctrine ?? The answer is some observable and dramatic shift in the nature of warfare. This is usually caused by some external war not involving China (like the Gulf Wars). So when the PLA sees a new military paradigm emerge, it re analyzes its own operational doctrine. It should be noted, that a change in warfare in itself is not enough to trigger a deep doctrinal shift. One more condition MUST be present. This is unity within the Chinese Communist Party ( CCP). It has been repeatedly demonstrated that periods of disunity in the CCP creates gridlock for PLA doctrinal changes. Only when a major change in warfare has been observed, AND the CCP is united can the desired changes can a new “strategic guideline” be issued. The Strategic Guideline - zhanlue fangzhen The top level document of change for the PLA is a new “Strategic Guideline”. What is curious , by western military standards, is that these Strategic Guidelines are often obscure and inexact. Often resembling high level sloganeering rather than concrete and specific mechanisms for change. The guidelines have three basic components. A) Identify the strategic opponent. B) Identify the strategic direction or geographical region of operation. C) State the basic guiding thought, the general operational principles applied to the conflict. Usually a slogan like "Lure them in Deep" or "Active Defense". China's Strategic Guidelines are drafted by the Central Military Committee (CMC). The CMC is NOT part of the PLA. It is a CCP organization. It is a party committee under the CCP Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC). This is one way the party assures top level control of PLA and its doctrine. One MUST always remember the PLA is party Army, not a state Army like most other countries. Once drafted, the new Strategic Guideline is circulated to an enlarged meeting of the PBSC and approved. Note, the PBSC itself only sees a “light” version of the new Strategic Guidline. It is not known if this for security reasons or just to spare the committee the boring details. Full complete Strategic Guidelines, even for those from 60 years ago are hard to find. The PLA does not have a tradition of published doctrine documents. The average PLA officer or soldier has few sources were they can read a strategic level document. In fact, China does not really have an effective and formal means of transmission of the new concepts of the guidelines in to the force structure at large. Dissemination is often by distributing selected excerpts and holding lower level seminars. This process is known as “chuanda wenjian”. This haphazard dissemination method is perceived as a major weakness of the PLA. Before looking at the most important shift in PLA Operational Doctrine of the last 70 years, we must point out one curious fact about these Strategic Guidelines . They never mention nuclear weapons. In fact, Chinese nuclear weapons policy is not under the authority of the PLA. It is again controlled by the CCP. As such, there is no“nuclear war fighting doctrine” as cited in numerous old Soviet and current Russian Federation operational doctrines. It appears the PLA chain of command does not hold the nuclear trigger. It also appears that China, like the USA, feels you cant “win” a nuclear war. The 1993 Strategic Guideline will be the focus of the remainder of this article. The 1993 Strategic Guideline In 1993, the PLA doctrine went from defending the Chinese mainland from invasion (USA or Soviet) to invading Taiwan and defending China’s growing overseas interests. The creation, adoption, and implementation of a new Strategic Guideline usually requires major changes to three areas : A) Operational Doctrine Operational Doctrine refers to the principles and concepts that a military uses to conduct operations. In the PLA, this is disseminated by operational regulations (zuozhan tiaoling) which are further broken down in to combat regulations (zhanyi tiaoling) and campaign outlines (zhanyi gangyao). B) Force Structure Force structure refers to the composition of an armed force in terms of the roles of different services (Army, Navy ,Air Force) and within a given service. A new Strategic Guideline can affect force structure in several ways. One example may be by reallocation of roles and resources between branches of the military. One example of this being shrinking the size of the Army and increasing the size of the Navy. Another example may be changing the internal structure of a military branch. For example, changing the main unit size from divisions to smaller more mobile brigades. Finally, it could be changes in how units are equipped and armed. An example being moving from light infantry brigades (foot soldiers) to mechanized infantry brigades (mobile and armored infantry that fight dismounted). C) Training. Training is always a costly and complex operation. It is not sexy and is often over looked. It is not as flashy as say, a new squadron of fighter jets. However, a new operational doctrine and force structure will not have the desired effects if the training component is not done right. This is perhaps the real Achilles heel of PLA modernization. In TDM’s opinion, this is the biggest impediment to the PLA becoming a truly effective, world class, combined arms military. Basically, you can create a new org chart and buy all the new toys you want, but without proper training, its a dissapointing result. The translation of higher level operational doctrine to a training curricula is seen as poor in the PLA. Even when the new curricula is created, it is often transmitted to the training system poorly. NOTE: Here at TDM we are firm believers that training is the most important component of a professional Military. We FIRMLY believe in the axiom “Inventory does NOT always equal capability”. Without proper doctrine and training, all weapons systems platforms are just flashy toys. Creation of the 1993 Strategic Guidline In January 1993, the CMC adopted a new Strategic Guideline. This was titled “Winning Local Wars Under High Technology Conditions. “ This is the biggest PLA doctrinal change since the 1956. It should be noted that here "local war” means not on the Chinese mainland, but an external regional war (like the gulf wars).What is odd about the 1993 Strategy Guideline is that it was so major, and adopted at a time of few threats to China. Previously, major strategic changes were triggered by a substantial threat to the Chinese mainland. By 1993, the Soviet threat was gone and relations with the US were quite positive. What did the Party see that alarmed it ?? The Gulf wars. First, the gulf wars showed a military using Soviet doctrine, equipment, tactics and training was utterly devastated by coalition combined arms maneuver warfare. Iraq invaded Kuwait in august 1990. The US then mobilized itself and its allies to respond. After a lengthy build up of forces in US Central Command (the Persian Gulf) the US launched operation Desert Storm in January 1991. After a month of intensive air strikes the ground operation crushed the Iraqi Army in 96 hours. 42 Iraqi division were destroyed or neutralized. This is one of the most lop sided victories in modern history. The PLA had predicted that US forces would get bogged down in protracted positional warfare like the previous Iran-Iraq war. The PLA had perceived the Iraqi army as battle hardened. The PLA could also see the Iraqi army was structured and equipped very similar to the PLA. Its defeat set off alarm bells all through out the CCP and the PLA. Creation of the 1993 Strategic Guidline Between March and June of 1991, the CMC held many intensive sessions. These were deemed so critical that Jiang Zemin attended many of them himself. The CMC then ordered a series of symposiums (zuotanhui) that in turn created seminars (yantaohui) to explore the ramifications of the Gulf War. The PLA would spend much time developing a response to the Gulf War. Three major conclusions were found. A) high technology now dominates the battlefield. B) this is the type of war China would face next. C) China was poorly prepared for this new warfare. Adoption of the 1993 Strategic Guideline What is remarkable to a western observer is the glacial pace of change in the PLA with regard to the 1993 strategy. The new final report on the Gulf war and its conclusion were not released until the year 2000. Why did it take so long to actually begin the adoption of the 1993 Strategic Guideline ?? One word - Tienanmen. As we have noted previously major change in the PLA can only occur when there is party unity. The massacre of young people at Tienanmen square in 1989 created great upheaval in the CCP. Deng Xiaoping's and the reformersauthority was diminished. Deng and the reformers would fight a years long battle to restore control and weaken the conservatives. The failed coup in in Russia in 1991 also shook up the party. This aggravated the leadership split. The effect of all this on the PLA was paralysis. The 1993 Strategic Guideline had been created. But not adopted and implemented. The CCP had bigger fish to fry. The CCP was in turmoil, so was the PLA. Many officers and troops displayed disloyalty during the crack down. The purges began, approximately 1400 soldiers were arrested and prosecuted. The CCP began exerting more control of the PLA. The CMC increased its power at the expenses of the PLA departments. Up to 50% of PLA training time was now devoted to political rectification. Major training exercises stopped. Almost all modernization programs halted. Over time Deng Xiaoping and his allies re asserted control of the CCP. He then completely re stocked the CMC with his own people. Adoption was now assured. The path was now clear for implementation of the what would hence be called the 1993 strategy. The results of these symposiums were finally adopted by the CMC in January 1993. Unfortunately, no details of this meeting have ever been published. Which seems odd for such a sweeping change. So, Was implementation successful ? We will look at that in the next Article. References Fravel, M. Taylor. Active Defense: China’s Military Strategy since 1949. Princeton University Press, 2019. Saunders, Phillip C., and Andrew Scobell. PLA Influence on China’s National Security Policymaking. Stanford Security Studies, an Imprint of Stanford University Press, 2015. Cooper; III, Cortez A. PLA Military Modernization: Drivers, Force ... - Rand Corporation, the RAND Corporation, www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT400/CT488/RAND_CT488.pdf. Accessed 24 Oct. 2023.