<< Lima Peru,MAR 30 2024>> EDITORS NOTE: Due to time constraints, this article is released raw. It may be expanded at a later time whem the TDM staff has returned to the USA. We apologize for any grammatical or spelling mistakes. Was the 1993 Strategic Guideline successful? Only Partially, they received new platforms and a new force structure but largely failed to change operational doctrine and training. CONFLICTED THINKING As usual, the transmission of the new doctrine to the forces was poor.  This has created conflicted thinking,much like stepping on the accelerator and the brakes simultaeneously.TDM believes the 1993 strategy is muddled and conflicted. Historically, the PRC had always used an “Active defense” strategy. This means letting the enemy strike first, then “Lure him in Deep” into the Chinese mainland for annihilation. This concept was almost institutionalized in the PLA. The 1993 Strategy oddly mixes active defense with striking the first blow. A PLA attack on Taiwan is not an active defense. Attacking, invading, or blockading Taiwan would be an overt offensive act. It is not defensive. However, it is construed in Chinese propaganda as implementing an active defense under the one-China policy. China claims Taiwan as part of China. So attacking Taiwan , in their minds, is an act of active defense within China. TDM believes this internal confliction leads to a kind of cognitive dissonance in the PLA. Calling something defensive at the propaganda level but conducting clearly offensive operations could lead to a disastrous mismatches between foreign policy, operational doctrine, and battlefield tactics. Invading Taiwan is NOT active defense, but it would fall under their concept of a local war. The 1993 strategy is very focused on local wars. Here the PLA is not conflicted. We have seen a more aggressive China with its force projection around the western Pacific region, especially in the South China Sea region with the Spratly Islands. TOP_DOWN VS BOTTOM UP COMMAND There are advantages and disadvantages when it comes to a top-down or a bottom-up command structure. China has very a top-down command structure, China must deal with many problems with this outdated command structure. PLA ideology is implemented on all levels, from the highest position to the lowest private on the battlefield. The Communist Party has ways of keeping the army under control. How do they achieve this? From the political aspect, the Communist Party, through collective leadership from the party committee systems. Also, there are political affairs officers (commissars) at all levels of command. The communist party achieves this through political commissars, who are the communist educational leaders of their units. The PLA political commissar acts as the ‘head of his unit along with the military commander at the same level and is jointly responsible for the work of the troops to which he belongs under the leadership of the party committee at the same level. This is basically a parallel command structure. This never good in combat situation. This is also a problem within the Chinese military structure. Chinese troops should be trained to perfect their combat skills, but they instead waste time in political training. This was especially true after the Tiananmen massacre.A bureaucratic and collective leadership is often slow to reach consensus. This can be a problem in wartime situations requiring quick decisions. It is not really clear how well or quickly the PLA HQ staff would adjust to changing strategic and operational situations. We suspect poorly. China has repeatedly demonstrated poor coordination between the Foreign Ministry, the Defense Ministry, the PLA, and the CCP. Too many cooks spoil the soup, and it not always clear who is in charge. This could be fatal in fast moving crisis. The co ordination of all the Leadership Small Groups (LSGs) and the CMC seems very awkward to us.On the battlefield, China’s top down military command structure has another problem: lower-level officers cannot move without orders from the higher-ups. This differs substantially from the Western military doctrine, which has the concept of “commanders intent.” This Western doctrine allows lower-level officers the flexibility to take the tactical initiatives necessary to achieve the objectives that higher-level officers have stipulated. LEADERSHIP INSTABILITY                The PLA, under Xi JinPing, has repeatedly purges top ranks of political leaders and officers in the PLA. This is frequent in authoritarian regimes because it aims to keep power from its factional rivals. However constant turn over in PLA leadership is not good for continuity of modernization policies. Trying to implement a new and far reaching strategic guideline while constantly churning staff is not a recipe for victory. But authoritarian regimes always put loyalty above competence.Xi JinPing has appointed loyal people to high positions in the CM C. However, loyalty does not mean competence; this has decreased the efficiency and effectiveness of the PLA military reforms. This is very important, especially if the PLA must go into actual combat. An invasion of Taiwan requires careful and complicated military planning. These military leaders that have been appointed because of loyalty may not be capable of planning such an ambitious amphibious operation. Due to this “yes-man” system, an invasion of Taiwan may be doomed before its even started. The “yes-man” system always gives a rosy picture of capability and readiness that may or may not be true. We could easily see a situation where an attack on Taiwan is launched on the mistaken assumption the PLA is ready for it. The churn in the officer corps continued even as this article was being wriiten. The head of the Rocket forces (formerly Second Artillery -think nuclear) and all his staff were relieved of command. JOINTNESS IN AN ARMY DOMINATED SYSTEM One of the problems with the PLA military structure is that the Army is in control of the People Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), People Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), People Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF), and People's Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLASSF).  How is this a problem? The ARMY and its land forces are the biggest problem with the PLA military specialty. How well can army generals understand the intricacies of naval warfare? Probably not very well.  Because land warfare differs from naval warfare, and the military tactics differ substantially. However, the Chinese military saw this, and with the military reforms of 2015, a new joint doctrine was created whose goal was to make the PLA a more efficient fighting force capable of winning local wars in different environments worldwide. Joint operations are how modern warfare is conducted. This is one doctrine the West trains a lot on to be proficient in joint operations. For officers in the United States, it is mandatory for them to be in charge of a joint operations command, and this affects your promotional status. At the same time, the PLA military does not emphasize this, which is a critical weakness within the PLA doctrine. Practicing joint operations can be a perishable skill, and acquiring it takes practice, which takes many hours to get your armies trained. “Building effective joint commanders will require changes not only to the military education system to teach soldiers about the other services and how to conduct joint operations.”  China can also use joint operations as an intimidation factor to show its developing power around South China and the western Pacific Ocean. This has always become prevalent when China does joint exercises around Taiwan to show them its evolving military power. But overall, China is trying to develop better joint operations, hoping to become a world-class military capable of going up against the United States and its allies.   The Dangers of Emulation Be careful who you emulate. Throughout much of recent history, the PRC looked to the USSR and later the Russian Federation to show the way of military operations.  But since the Gulf wars (and possibly now the Ukraine war), the Soviet/Russian examples have lost their allure. The Russian army's attempt to modernize to Western standards, known as the Serdyukov reforms, particularly in tactics and doctrine, proved superficial and ultimately unsuccessful. Implementation of the new Russian Battalion Tactical Group (BTG) in Ukraine has failed (the subject of future article), leading Russia to announce a return to a divisional structure. Previously, China considered the Russian military reforms a potential model, but their failure prompted a reassessment within the PLA. Poor Weapons Quality   Finally, countries like Pakistan and some in South America have acquired high-tech weapons from China and have reported subpar performance, poor reliability, and inadequate spare parts and replacement services. This raises concerns about the quality of Chinese military equipment and prompts a reevaluation of the PLA's approach. They may buy high-tech weapons from China, but that does not mean they are comparable to equipment from the United States. This is important when it comes to engaging with naval and air power in the Western Pacific region. Because over time, the Chinese PLAAF has upgraded its inventory, but that does not mean its 4th generation fighters have the same quality and technology as the United States Navy or Air Force .  “The net effect of these changes has been to narrow, but not close, the qualitative gap between the U.S. and Chinese air forces.” Another critical aspect of the Chinese PLAN is its surface, submarine, and amphibious fleet. Because these are going to be the primary units that are going to be facing off against Taiwan and the West. The Chinese submarine fleet has been subpar compared to the United States, but China is improving its equipment. Currently, Chinese submarine capabilities are at  poor acoustic noise level; “the level of quieting in China’s current SSN, the Shang class, is estimated to be on par with Soviet designs from the 1970s.” This is important because China will have to go up against more advanced submarines from the United States. With China having louder submarines, its anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities will be affected. While China has invested much money into building new surface ships, one component they have not upgraded much is their ASW platforms. Surface ships' biggest enemy is submarines because they are underwater, which means surface ships and helicopters can only detect them through active or passive sonar capabilities. This will disadvantage the Chinese Navy if they decide to go up against the United States Navy. But the Chinese PLAN is learning and is getting better every year.   CORRUPTION This is legendary in the PLA. The latest purges in the Rocket Forces shows the depth of this problem at ALL levels of the PLA. This issue way beyond the scope of this article. But it will be the detailed subject of a future one.      IS THE PLA A PAPER TIGER ? No! It can still : 1. Revert to mass attack warfare against any neighbor but at a substantial cost. Russian meat waves in Ukraine prove this. 2. Bully smaller countries like Vietnam and those in the South China Sea. 3. Enforce its Maritime Exclusion Zones. 4. Show the Flag in Foreign Ports. 5. Attempt to blockade and bomb Taiwan and try to hold off US intervention. It will NOT be able to : 1. Take on the west far beyond its shores, like the First Island Chain, Second Island Chain, or the Indian Ocean. 2. It will not be able to invade Taiwan successfully. It would only be able to “frustration bomb” and blockade. 3. It Won't be able to project sea power very far from its own shores. Tyranny of Distance: The farther from China it gets, The weaker the PLA and PLAN becomes. The PLANAF appears to have no expeditionary capability what so ever. 4. Wont be able to protect its Sea Lines Of Communications (SLOCs). If China blockades Taiwan, the West will blockade China. Even if China controls the South China Sea, it is easy to plug the Malacca and Sunda straits—no Oil or Minerals for China. The only route then is already capacity-constrained trans-Siberian railroad. This would be a narrow throat indeed to breath through. COUNTER ARGUMENTS TO OUR THESIS Increasing technological advancements, particularly in communications, may enhance the combat effectiveness of the top-down command structure. However, a counterargument suggests that reliance on such communications creates vulnerability, as the U.S. military could potentially jam or disrupt these channels, making it challenging to relay crucial c from top to bottom. This vulnerability might even lead to the paralysis or spoofing of PLA command centers. In terms of modernization, a partial approach may be considered. Given the magnitude of modernizing the whole PLA, it might establish smaller, highly advanced, rapid reaction forces that undergo complete modernization. This results in a "two-tiered" military structure featuring modernized or "silver-bullet" forces alongside a larger contingent of traditionally equipped units within regional commands.  Given the size of its military, even a moderate percentage of its forces modernized to this level would overwhelm most regional opponents. CURRENT PARTY DISUNITY A truly grand restructuring into a modern combined arms military becomes unlikely without party cohesion. The Hu jin tao and jiang Zemin factions of the CCP are not destroyed yet. They still exist in vast beauracracy of the chinese state. They have survived Xis purges at the top, and will excat their revenge. Their is NO party unity at this time. CONCLUSION  So, was the 1993 Strategic Guideline and its successors successfully implemented. TDM gives the following grades : Operational Doctrine : C+ Force Structure : B- Training: D Overall Grade : C- TDM firmly believes that doctrinal restructuring is of paramount importance for a meaningful modernization. Simply improving the inventory without a corresponding adjustment in operation doctrine, force structure, and training risks rendering resource usage ineffective. The need for a synchronized approach that aligns military capabilities with strategic objectives is required. We don’t see this in the current PLA. TDM always supports the maxim “INVENTORY DOES NOT ALWAYS EQUAL CAPABILITY”