<< Dallas TX, JAN 18 2024 >> << re factored on DEC 6 2024 >> Critical Assessment of Sentinel ICBM Deployment: Strategic and Operational Concerns At TDM, we strongly advocate for robust defense spending to ensure American military superiority against any adversary. However, we occasionally encounter programs that fail to justify their costs or strategic rationale. One such program is the new Sentinel Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). While the missile itself may meet operational needs, its proposed basing strategy raises significant strategic and fiscal concerns. Rationale for Replacing Minuteman III We recognize the urgent need to replace the aging Minuteman III ICBM system. This platform, despite numerous overhauls, is nearing the end of its operational viability. A modern land-based ICBM system is essential to maintaining the U.S. nuclear triad. However, the decision to base the Sentinel in fixed silos, replicating the Minuteman III’s deployment model, is a deeply flawed choice. The Vulnerability of Fixed Silos in Modern Warfare Historically, fixed, hardened silos provided effective protection due to the limited precision of nuclear weapons in the 1960s and 1970s. Back then, targeting errors of hundreds of meters allowed silos to survive near misses. Today, this is no longer the case. Enhanced Accuracy: Modern guidance systems achieve accuracies within tens of meters, rendering hardened silos indefensible against a direct strike. Even a 100-kiloton warhead detonating within 100 meters would obliterate any silo. Advancing Russian Capabilities: Russia retains large warheads from the Cold War, now paired with modern precision-guidance technologies. Sentinel missiles housed in fixed silos are highly vulnerable, effectively making them "first-strike bait". Strategic Implications of Fixed Deployment Fixed Sentinel silos could destabilize the strategic balance: Temptation for Preemptive Strikes: In a crisis, adversaries might perceive these static targets as an opportunity for a first strike, aiming to neutralize a significant portion of U.S. land-based nuclear forces. Risk of "Launch on Warning": To avoid a "use it or lose it" scenario, the U.S. might feel compelled to launch missiles upon early warning, increasing the risk of catastrophic errors due to false alarms. Erosion of Deterrence: The predictability of fixed silos undermines the deterrent value of the Sentinel system, making it less effective against potential aggressors. The Case for Mobile Basing A mobile basing strategy—whether rail or truck-based—would address these vulnerabilities by introducing uncertainty into an adversary’s calculations. A mix of mobile and static deployments would complicate targeting plans and reduce the likelihood of a successful first strike. Challenges of Mobile Systems: Critics of mobile systems often cite force protection and logistical challenges, such as securing missile convoys. While valid, these issues are not insurmountable and should have been addressed during Sentinel's development. Mitigating Vulnerabilities: The Role of Point Defense ABM Systems With the Sentinel already slated for deployment in fixed silos, an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense system offers the only viable means of enhancing survivability. Point Defense vs. Regional Defense: A point defense ABM system focused on protecting missile fields in specific regions (e.g., North Dakota) is more achievable than attempting nationwide coverage. Proven Technologies: Existing systems like Aegis Ashore, coupled with SM-3 interceptors, could provide exoatmospheric protection against missile threats. Additionally, SM-6 missiles might address cruise missile threats, though this would be secondary. Complicating Attack Plans: While no ABM system is foolproof, introducing a credible point defense layer would significantly complicate an attacker’s strategic calculus, reducing the likelihood of a preemptive strike. Policy Recommendations Reconsider Mobile Deployment: Future iterations of Sentinel should prioritize a mobile basing model to enhance survivability and deterrence. Deploy Point Defense Systems: Expedite the development and deployment of point defense ABM systems, such as Aegis Ashore, to protect fixed Sentinel silos. Reevaluate the Land-Based Leg of the Triad: If survivability concerns cannot be addressed, the viability of maintaining a land-based ICBM force should be reconsidered. The U.S. could rely on its submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and strategic bombers to uphold the nuclear triad. Conclusion The decision to base Sentinel in fixed silos undermines its strategic utility and introduces unnecessary risks. While alternatives like mobile basing or ABM systems present logistical and technical challenges, they are essential to ensuring the survivability and effectiveness of this critical component of the nuclear triad. The current course, without additional safeguards, is a strategic misstep that could destabilize deterrence and increase the likelihood of catastrophic miscalculation. At TDM, we firmly believe that the U.S. must prioritize resilience and adaptability in its nuclear strategy. Whether through mobility, point defense, or a reevaluation of the triad itself, steps must be taken to address the Sentinel’s glaring vulnerabilities.