<< Dallas TX, OCT 17 2025 >> The Russian SSN Fleet : Slow Ride to Irrelevance Here at TDM we have been surprised at the lack of reporting on what we see as a major change in the global military balance. This is the long slow withering away of the once feared Russia nuclear attack sub fleet (SSN). Given its massive strategic implications, this trend is surprisingly ignored by legacy media,and even most mil sites. Here at TDM we subscribe to the motto “There are only two types of ships,submarines and targets”. A nuclear submarine is a formiddable weapon. The terminal decline of the Russian SSN fleet is a major win for the west. In this article we will document and enumerate the Russian SSN decline. Then we will assert why this decline is functionally irreversable. So lets start by looking at where the Russian SSN fleet is today. Its current status so to speak. What is an SSN ? A SSN, or nuclear-powered attack submarine, is a fast, stealthy undersea vessel designed primarily for hunting and destroying enemy submarines and surface ships. Unlike diesel-electric submarines, SSNs use a nuclear reactor for propulsion, giving them virtually unlimited range and the ability to remain submerged for months at a time. Their endurance, speed, and ability to operate undetected make them among the most capable and flexible assets in any navy. Modern SSNs are equipped with advanced sonar, torpedoes, and cruise missiles, allowing them to engage targets across multiple domains—undersea, surface, and land. The role and mission of an SSN center on sea control, power projection, intelligence gathering, and deterrence. In peacetime, SSNs conduct covert surveillance, track foreign naval activity, and collect electronic and acoustic intelligence. During conflict, they hunt enemy submarines, interdict surface shipping, and strike land targets with precision-guided missiles. They also support special operations forces by deploying commandos close to hostile shores. By remaining unseen yet ever-present, SSNs provide strategic leverage and deter adversaries through the constant threat of sudden, precise, and overwhelming undersea attack. Current Russian SSN composition by class • Yasen / Yasen-M (Project 885 / 885M) — the newest, most capable multi-mission SSNs. About 4–6 boats are in service (Severodvinsk, Kazan, Novosibirsk, plus additional Yasen-M hulls accepted or commissioned in 2023–2025). These are the ones Russia is building to replace older attack boats. • Akula (Project 971 / 971I) — the backbone of the Cold-War SSN force. Roughly 6–8 hulls remain operational or in post-refit trials (several others are laid up or in long refit). Status varies per hull and fleet (Northern vs Pacific). • Victor III / other late-Soviet designs (Project 671RTMK, Project 945A Sierra II, etc.) — a handful (1–3) remain in service or reserve; many are in reserve/awaiting repair. These are aging and being progressively retired. • Sierra class (Project 945/945A) -is a Soviet/Russian nuclear-powered attack submarine built in the 1980s–90s with a titanium hull, allowing exceptional diving depth, low noise, and high survivability. • Special-purpose nuclear boats (e.g., AS-31 “Losharik”) — usually counted separately as “special-purpose” but present and nuclear-powered; they are not conventional attack SSNs but are important assets for deep-ocean work and covert tasks. Losharik and similar boats exist in small numbers. These “specialty” subs and SSGNs (cruise-missile nuclear boats such as Project 949/949A “Oscar” types) will be ignored for this article. So lets look at Russian SSN numbers by by age, build rate, and replacement plans. Then we will project what the fleet will plausibly look like in 10–20 years. Current Russian SSN force Structure (2025) Class Commissioned Number Built Still Active Average Age Victor III 1982–1991 ~26 1–2 35–40 yrs NOTE: Only a few Northern Fleet hulls remain operational. Near end of life. Class Commissioned Number Built Still Active Average Age Sierra I/II 1986–1993 4 1–2 30–35 yrs NOTE: Titanium hulls, expensive to maintain. Class Commissioned Number Built Still Active Average Age Akula I/II 1986–2009 15~6–8 active/refit 25–35 yrs NOTE: The “core” of the current SSN force. Aging fast; several are inactive. Class Commissioned Number Built Still Active Average Age Yasen/M 2013–present 1 + 6 built 4-6 0-10 yrs 6 more planned NOTE: Modern, very expensive and slow to build (~1 every 2–3 years). Yasen-M construction rate is about one every 2–3 years (Severodvinsk yard Sevmash is the only builder). 4 Yasen / M are operational and 3–4 more under construction; even optimistic projections see maybe 8 by 2035, 10–11 by 2040. By ALL accounts, the Yasens are formidable boats. The Obsolescence Curve That means no more than 1/3 of the current SSN fleet will be modernized within the next 10–15 years. In addition, even with increased funding, production and shipyard capacity constraints will limit any “rebirth” of the Russian SSN fleet. The target announced in official plans was 10–12 Yasens total by 2030s, but that assumed pre-sanctions material supply and higher funding levels. Its not going to happen due to the Ukraine War. Perhaps the biggest problem for the Russian SSN fleet is “block obsolescence”. That is when a large number of hulls retires at about the same time. This creates a “bow wave” of retirements that no new production can quickly mitigate. This huge block obsolescence wave is a direct result of the complete shutdown of SSN production in the 1990s. Between 1990 and 2010 only 3 new SSNs were completed. Only one was of the new design Yasen class. The Russian fleet still suffers from this procurement disaster today. So what does block obsolescence look like ?? The Victor/Sierra types will be gone by 2030. The Akulas, built mostly 1988–1995, will reach hull and reactor end-of-life around 2035–2040, even with refits. Refitting helps electronics and sonar, but cannot fix aging reactor cores,radiation embrittlement, or acoustic quieting deficiencies. By mid-2030s, unless production magically accelerates dramatically, half or more of Russia’s SSNs will have to retire without replacement. As we have seen, there is little chance of SSN production increasing meaningfully in the future. Future Russian SSN Force Structure Scenarios (2035-40) So the current Russian SSN situation is not good,but what does the future look like ?? The most likely Scenario • By ~2035: ◦ 6–8 Yasen/Yasen-M ◦ 3–4 late Akulas (refitted) Total ~10–12 viable SSNs • Mix of multi-role cruise missile carriers (Yasens) and remaining patrol/escort Akulas. The most Pessimistic Scenario (budget/industrial constraints continue) • By ~2035: ◦ 5–6 Yasens, a few Akulas limping along. ◦ Effective SSN strength drops to 6–8 total, split between two fleets. ◦ Pacific Fleet particularly weak (maybe 2–3 hulls). Most Optimistic Scenario (sustained funding, no major industrial setbacks) • By ~2040: ◦ 10–11 Yasens in service (assuming every hull under contract completes). ◦ Possible next-gen “Laika” or “Husky” class begins to replace Akulas after 2040. Even in this case, total SSN numbers barely exceed current levels — they simply modernize and replace one-for-one. Strategic Implications Massive Block obsolescence the period late 2020s–mid-2030s where retirements outpace new build has permanently weakened the Russian fleet. Operational risk: This has created coverage gaps in Northern & Pacific Fleets; long deployment cycles aggravate this. Doctrinal shift: SSNs increasingly used for standoff Kalibr/Oniks strike rather than forward ASW patrols, partly because they can’t maintain large numbers for sea control. Industrial limits: one nuclear sub construction line (Sevmash) simultaneously building Borei SSBNs, Yasen SSGNs/SSNs, and special-purpose boats — throughput is the bottleneck. Even more funding wont fix this problem. Operational Availabilty One of the least-discussed but most decisive differences between the USN and the Russian submarine force is Operational Availabilty. That is how many subs do you need in service to keep one sub on patrol. Lets contrast the USN and the Russian sub fleets. U.S. Navy baseline. For Los Angeles, Virginia, or Seawolf-class SSNs, the rule of thumb is: 3 boats = 1 forward-deployed, 1 training/local ops, 1 in maintenance or refit. Modern boat availability (especially Virginias) is roughly 0.33–0.4 deployable fraction at any given time. Maintenance cycles are regularized, logistics are global, and the U.S. has forward bases (Guam, Rota, Faslane, etc.), allowing sustained overseas patrols. Russian Navy baseline. Basic ratio Russian sources and Western naval intelligence analyses (ONI, FAS, H. I. Sutton) estimate that: It takes 4–5 Russian SSNs to keep one at sea on station. That means an availability rate of roughly 20–25% — substantially lower than the U.S. Navy’s 33–40%. Why is the Russian rate so low ?? Maintenance infrastructure Concentrated in a few shipyards (Severodvinsk, Vilyuchinsk). Turnaround for nuclear refits can take years, not months. Operational tempo Submarines spend more time alongside for overhaul, fueling, and maintenance due to aging systems. Spare parts shortages and sanctions delay repairs, especially for Akula and Sierra classes. Many Soviet era factories that made these parts simply don’t exist anymore. Reactor type Older boats require refueling outages after 10–12 years; modern Yasen cores last longer, but there are few of them. Modern USN Virginia Class boats have 30 year cores for life of boat. No complex overhauls. Geographic constraints Northern Fleet and Pacific Fleet both require long transits just to reach patrol areas; weather limits operations in Arctic basing. This problem affects the Russian surface fleet too. So, at any given time (2024–2025) at most 2–3 Russian SSNs are actually at sea, of which only one may be on a “combat patrol” beyond home waters. This matches observed satellite and acoustic data: NATO sub hunters report 1–2 active Northern Fleet SSNs on station in the Atlantic at most times. Over time this number could improve slightly as more available Yasen boats become available. Conclusion By the 2030s, even with modernization, Russia will likely have only 8–10 operational SSNs but can keep only 2–3 continuously deployed. That is not enough for a sustained oceanic presence. Their doctrine will instead continue to prioritize “bastion defense” of SSBNs(Northern Fleet) and episodic long-range deterrence patrols rather than constant global deployment. This means Russia is NO LONGER a naval superpower. Given the Russian penchant for using SSNs to protect their SSBN fleet, it leaves basically near zero capacity for sea control missions. This is critical as its means the USA reinforcing Europe by sea in war time just got a lot easier. This means more USN assets can be dedicated to dealing with China. Basically the size of the USN Atlantic fleet ASW assets can shrink accordingly. So, the Russian SSN Fleet will contract in 2030–2035 . The retirements of Akulas and Sierras will outpace new Yasen deliveries. The total Russian SSN force will dip to 8–9 boats. By 2040, a small recovery will occur. The older generation boats are then fully replaced by modern ones. Operational availability improves a bit, and the SSN force total stabilizes near 10–11. Two insurmountable issues insure this pitiful outcome. The first, is the block obsolescence period (2030–2035) that creates a sharp and unavoidable “valley” in force strength. Operational availability will fall below 3–4 deployable SSNs globally. Second, an industrial bottleneck (the Sevmash yard capacity) is the primary limiter to SSN numbers growth. Russia prioritizes SSBN construction, so even in the most optimistic scenarios, only building one nuclear attack sub every 2–3 years appears realistic. The Russian SSN fleet is on a slow ride to oblivion and irrelevance. Good news indeed ! REFERENCES 1. Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). Russia Submarine Capabilities. NTI.org https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/russia-submarine-capabilities/ 2. RussianShips.info. Current List of Russian Navy Ships and Submarines. https://russianships.info/eng/today/ 3. Wikipedia. List of Active Russian Navy Ships. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_active_Russian_Navy_ships 4. Wikipedia. Yasen-class Submarine. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yasen-class_submarine